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SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 
FEDERAL 
COLLATERAL 
ATTACK OF 
STATE CONVICTIONS 
SHARPLY 
CURTAILED 
By Charles Jay Iseman 
The Supreme Court of the United 
States, in the two recent companion 
cases of Stone v. Powell and Wolff v. 
Rice, 96S.Ct. 3037 (1976), sharply cur-
tailed access to federal courts by persons 
convicted of crimes in state courts. The 
Court held that " ... where the State has 
provided an opportunity for full and fair 
litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, 
a state prisoner may not be granted fed-
eral habeas corpus relief on the ground 
that evidence obtained in an unconstitu-
tional search or seizure was introduced 
at his trial." [d. at 3052. Prior to this deci-
sion, if a defendant convicted in state 
court had objected unsuccessfully to the 
admission of evidence allegedly ob-
tained pursuant to an illegal search and 
seizure, and had subsequently 
exhausted all his appeals, he still had the 
right to "collaterally attack" his convic-
tion by bringing a habeas corpus action 
in federal district courts. 
FACTS 
Powell became involved in a Califor-
nia liquor store altercation which re-
sulted in the death of the store man-
ager's wife. Ten hours later Powell was 
arrested for vagrancy in Nevada. In a 
search incident to the vagrancy arrest, 
the Nevada police discovered a .38 
caliber revolver with six expended car-
tridges in the cylinder. Powell was extra-
dited to California where he was con-
victed in state court of second degree 
murder. He sought unsuccessfully to 
exclude under Mapp v. Ohio, 367 US. 
643 (1961), the revolver and the tes-
timony of the Nevada police officer, on 
the grounds that the Nevada vagrancy 
statute was unconstitutionally vague and 
that consequently his arrest and the en-
suing search and seizure were unlawful. 
Powell's second degree murder convic-
tion was affirmed by a California District 
Court of Appeals, which held that the 
admission of the police officer's tes-
timony was, at most, harmless error. The 
Supreme Court of California denied 
Powell's petition for habeas corpus re-
lief. A United States District Court de-
nied Powell's amended petition for a writ 
of federal habeas corpus. The United 
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit reversed, finding that the va-
grancy ordinance was unconstitutionally 
vague, rendering Powell's arrest illegal. 
In Wolff v. Rice, supra, Rice was con-
victed of murder in a Nevada state court. 
The Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed 
the conviction, finding that the in-
criminating evidence was properly ad-
mitted, having been seized pursuant to a 
search conducted under a valid search 
warrant. A United States District Court 
granted Rice's petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus on the ground that the 
search warrant was invalid because the 
supporting affidavit did not meet the 
Aguilar-Spinelli test. See Spinelli v. Uni-
ted States, 393 US. 410 (1969); Aguilar 
v. Texas, 378 US. 108 (1964). The 
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit 
affirmed. Powell v. Stone, 507 F.2d 93 
(1974). 
THE COURT'S OPINION 
The Supreme Court granted a writ of 
certiorari, Stone v. Powell, 96 S.Ct. 29 
(1975), for the purpose of addressing the 
issues of the proper scope of federal 
habeas corpus and the exclusionary 
rule. The Court examined the historical 
development of both the writ of habeas 
corpus in the United States and the crea-
tion and expansion of the exclusionary 
rule to enforce the Fourth Amendment's 
ban on unreasonable searches and sei-
zures. The Court found that the 
exclusionary rule has been stringently 
applied in federal criminal cases. This 
application flows from the Supreme 
Court's administrative role as supervisor 
over the federal courts and from its at-
tempt to maintain order and integrity 
within the federal judiciary by setting the 
highest possible standards. The Court 
further found that the reason for the 
Mapp extension of the exclusionary rule 
to the states was the belief that exclusion 
of illegally seized evidence would deter 
future illegal police conduct. However, 
the Court noted that the evidence 
excluded by the rule tends to have great 
probative value in establishing guilt or 
innocence. 
Consequently, the rule results in 
evidentiary windfalls to criminals rather 
than protection for the pUblic. The Court 
stated: 
Application of the rule thus deflects 
the truth finding process and often 
frees the guilty. The disparity in par-
ticular cases between the error com-
mitted by the police officer and the 
windfall afforded a guilty defendant 
by application of the rule is contrary to 
the idea of proportionality that is es-
sential to the concept of justice. Thus, 
although the rule is thought to deter 
unlawful police activity in part for the 
nurturing of respect for the Fourth 
Amendment values, if applied indis-
criminately it may well have the oppo-
site effect of generating disrespect for 
the law and the administration of jus-
tice. These long-recognized costs of 
the rule persist when a criminal con-. 
viction is sought to be overturned on 
collateral review on the ground that a 
search-and-seizure claim was errone-
ously rejected by two or more tiers of 
state courts. 96 S. Ct. at 3050. 
In concluding, the Court balanced the 
rights of the accused with the public 
interests in both safety and the efficient 
administration of justice. As a result of 
this decision, once a defendant con-
victed in state court has exhausted all of 
his state appellate review, with each step 
proViding the right to be heard, he may 
not collaterally attack the admission of al-
legedly illegally seized evidence through 
the federal habeas corpus procedure. 
